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Summary  findings
Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven investigate the  development are an indirect but effective way to raise
policy and nonpolicv factors behind saving disparities,  private saving rates.
using a large panel data set and an encompassing  Predictions of the life-cycle hypothesis are
approach including several relevant determinants of  supported  in that dependency ratios generally have a
private saving. They extend the literature in several  negative effect on private saving rates.
dimensions by:  The precautionary motive for saving is supported  by
* Using the largest data set on aggregate saving  the finding that inflation - conventionally taken as a
assembled to date.  summary measure of macroeconomic volatility - has a
* Using panel instrumental variable techniques to  positive impact on private saving, holding other facts
correct for endogeneity and heterogeneity.  constant.
* Performing robustness checks on changes in  *  Fiscal policy is a moderately effective tool for raising
estimation procedures, data samples, and model  national saving.
specification.  *  The direct effects of financial liberalization are
Their main empirical findings:  largely detrimental to private saving rates. Greater
* Private saving rates show considerable inertia (are  availability of credit reduces the private saving rate;
highly serially correlated even after controlling for other  financial depth and higher real interest rates do not
relevant factors).  increase saving.
* Private saving rates rise with the level and growth
rate of real per capita income. So policies that spur
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1. Introduction
Over the last three decades the world has witnessed a marked divergence in saving
rates, particularly dramatic within the developing world: saving rates have risen steadily in
East Asia, stagnated in Latin America, and fallen in Sub-Saharan Africa. These regional
saving disparities have been closely matched by diverging growth experiences: across world
regions, higher saving rates tend to be correlated with higher income growth.
This large variation in saving performance across countries and over time raises a
number of  questions. Why  do  saving rates  differ so much  across  countries and  time
periods? How much do public policies contribute to these saving disparities, in comparison
to other structural and non-policy saving determinants?
From the  policy perspective, there  are serious  questions about  the  size  --  and
sometimes even about the sign -- of the effects of policy variables on saving rates. How
effective is fiscal policy in raising national saving? Does financial  liberalization -- by
raising interest rates,  encouraging consumer and housing lending, and  raising financial
depth -- inhibit or  encourage private saving? Does foreign lending crowd out national
saving? Or perhaps growth-enhancing policies -- such as macro stabilization and structural
reform -- would be more effective in raising saving through higher income and growth than
any direct saving incentive?
In this paper we address the above questions empirically, by exploiting what we
believe is the largest cross-country time-series macroeconomic data  set  on  saving and
related variables assembled to date. The data set is unique because of various features.'
First, it encompasses industrial and developing countries and covers nearly 30 years of data.
Second, it provides alternative saving measures (for the nation, the central government, the
public sector, and the private sector separately; unadjusted and adjusted for inflation-related
capital gains and losses). Third, it has been subject to  extensive quality checks, which
among other things allow us to  identify problematic observations and set them aside if
necessary.
The objective of the paper is to use this large data set to establish the stylized facts
concerning  the  effects  on  the  private  saving  rate  of  its  key  policy  and  non-policy
determinants identified in  the  literature. To  do  this,  the paper  estimates a  variety  of
empirical equations for the private saving rate. Private saving regressions are estimated for.
a worldwide sample of countries, as well as separately for industrial and developing country
subsamples. For completeness, the paper also presents regression results for the national
saving  rate. In  order  to  encompass a  broad  range of  saving  determinants,  and  hence
theoretical views about saving, we use a variety of reduced-form linear specifications rather
than one  narrow model  of  saving derived from  first  principles. 2 We  believe that  this
approach provides a useful first step to identify the key empirical regularities in need of
structural explanation.
We estimate our empirical equations using various panel data procedures, paying
particular attention to the issues of simultaneity and country heterogeneity that are mostly
ignored in earlier studies. Specifically, our large panel data set allows the use of "internal"3
instruments to correct for these problems.  This permits us to make some progress towards
drawing inferences on the effects of policy and non-policy variables on private saving rates,
rather than merely describing their association.
The paper  is  organized as follows.  Section 2  summarizes  briefly  recent  cross-
country empirical  studies  of private  saving.  Section 3 presents  our  empirical  strategy,
describing the data set and estimation approach.  Section 4 reports the econometric results
for  the  private  (and  national)  saving  rate  using  a  variety  of  samples,  regression
specifications, and estimation techniques. The paper closes with brief concluding remarks.
2.  Determinants of Private Saving Rates in Previous Panel Studies
Table 1 summarizes potential determinants of private saving rates and lists their
expected signs according to  consumption theory. 3 A number of recent empirical studies
have estimated the effect of various economic and demographic variables on private saving
rates in cross-country time-series (panel) samples. In order to provide a summary on the
empirical evidence related to each of the saving determinants under consideration, the last
column in Table 1 lists the qualitative results of 6 recent studies using large panel data
samples. They comprise studies  for both  industrial  and developing  countries  (Masson,
Bayoumi, and Samiei 1995; Edwards 1996; and Bailliu and Reisen 1998), for industrial-
country samples (Haque, Pesaran, and Sharma 1999), and for developing-country samples
(Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel 1991; and Dayal-Ghulati and Thimann 1997).
The common feature of these papers is that they are based on reduced-form saving
equations, not necessarily  derived from first  principles. 4  They differ  widely in  other
dimensions, as they are based on different sample periods and  countries as well as  on
different model  specifications and estimation techniques. Not  surprisingly, only  a  few
saving determinants appear to be consistently significant across different studies and with
their estimated signs according to theory. They include the terms of trade, domestic and
foreign  borrowing  constraints,  fiscal  policy  variables,  and  pension  system  variables.
Regarding other determinants for which consumption theories either differ regarding their
signs or point toward ambiguous signs, as in the case of income growth and interest rates,
these empirical studies differ widely. They also differ in reported significance levels of
variables for which theories tend to agree on expected signs, such as income level, inflation,
and demographic dependency ratios.
3.  Empirical strategy
The  above  empirical  studies  capture  a  number  of  factors  relevant  to  saving
decisions,  but  vary  considerably  in  terms  of  data  coverage  and  quality,  empirical
specification and  econometric procedure. Our primary objective here  is to  extend this
literature  by  providing  a  comprehensive characterization of  the  empirical  association
between private saving rates and a broad range of potentially important saving determinants
using the best available data. To do this, we complement and extend previous work along
three dimensions. First, we use the largest set of consistent macroeconomic data on saving
assembled to date. Second, we adopt a reduced-form approach encompassing a variety of
saving determinants identified in the literature - rather than adhere to one particular narrow
structural model. Third, we employ a variety of estimation methods, but focus our attention4
on estimators that attempt to control for heterogeneity and simultaneity, two problems that
likely plague most previous empirical studies.
3.1  The Data
Our basic data set draws from the saving database recently constructed at the World
Bank, and described in detail in Loayza, Lopez, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (1998a). To
our knowledge, such database represents the largest macroeconomic data set on saving and
related variables presently available. It comprises a maximum of  150 countries and spans
the years 1965-1994. The data have been subject to extensive consistency checks, and hence
they also represent an important improvement in terms of quality relative to other existing
data sets. 5
The data set excludes the countries for which we found inconsistencies in basic
National  Account,  fiscal  and  financial  data.  These  data  limitations  prevented  the
construction of  reliable  saving  measures, their  disaggregation into public  and  private
saving, and/or the calculation of the inflation adjustments for the latter. For some of the key
variables in this  paper, the effective data coverage in  countries and  years is  therefore
limited.  Nevertheless,  for  the  "core" private  saving regression,  presented  below,  we
initially count with 1,254 complete observations spanning the years 1966-95.
From this initial sample, we decided to exclude the observations corresponding to
high inflation episodes.  We base this  decision on the  fact that high  inflation distorts
severely measured public  and  private  saving (particularly the  inflation-adjusted saving
measures). 6 Moreover, in general high inflation renders National Account statistics largely
unreliable.  For practical purposes, we set a threshold of +/- 50 percent annual inflation.
We apply the same threshold to the real interest rate, which in cases of high inflation is
mostly driven by inflation.  For the "core" specification, these data adjustments lead to the
direct loss of 49 observations. 7
In  order  to  achieve  a  minimum  time-series  dimension,  as  well  as  to  reserve
sufficient observations to implement our instrumental-variable estimators described below,
we  limit  our  sample  coverage  to  those  countries  with  at  least  5  consecutive annual
observations. After all these adjustments, the sample for our "core" specification consists of
1,148 observations.  Since  four  observations per  country  must  be  selt aside  for  the
construction of instruments, the "core" regression sample consists of 872 observations for
69 countries - 20 industrial and 49 developing.  As explained below, We also estimate
regressions for the national saving rate and for private saving rates derived frrom  a narrower
definition of the public sector. For these regressions, the available sample comprises about
1,800 annual observations for 98 countries in the case of national saving rates and between
750-900 observations for 69countries in the case of private saving rates, depending on the
precise definition of the private and public sectors. 8 This sample coverage exceeds that of
Edwards (1996), who considers 32 countries, and Masson, Bayoumi and  Samici (1995),
whose sample includes 61 countries.
Finally, note that these panel data sets are heavily unbalanced, with the number of
time-series observations varying considerably across countries.  The top panel of Table  15
provides information as to the composition of the "core" regression sample per decade and
development stage. Developing countries account for over  half of  the total  number of
observations, and the 1980s are the decade most heavily represented in the data.
The precise definition of saving that we use also deserves comment. As in Loayza,
L6pez, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (1998b), for the nation as a whole our basic income
measure is gross national disposable income (GNDI), equal to GNP plus all net unrequited
transfers from abroad. 9 Gross national saving is then defined as GNDI minus consumption
expenditure, with both measured at current prices.
In turn, for the private sector we implement four alternative measures of disposable
income and gross saving.  These follow from the definition chosen for the public sector
(i.e., consolidated central government or broad public sector) and from whether the private
and public income and saving figures are adjusted or not for capital gains and losses due to
inflation. We respectively label the four alternatives that result as CU (unadjusted data
corresponding  to the central government definition), CA (same as CU but after adjusting for
inflationary capital gains and losses), PU  (unadjusted data  corresponding to  the public
sector definition of the govermnent), and PA (inflation-adjusted PU data). Notice that by
construction the CA and CU configurations lump local governments and public enterprises
together with the private sector. In turn, the PA and PU definitions of the public sector
correspond to  either the  general government or, when  available, the consolidated non-
financial public sector, inclusive of public enterprises. Hence, of these four altematives, the
analytically preferable one is clearly PA.  This is the private saving definition on which we
base our "core" regression and most of our experiments. In contrast, most empirical studies
use the more-readily available, but analytically problematic, CU measure.
In  each case, gross private  saving is computed as the  difference between gross
national saving and the relevant definition of gross public saving. Gross private disposable
income (henceforth GPDI) is likewise measured as the difference between GNDI and gross
public disposable income, itself equal to the sum of public saving and public consumption.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for the five saving
ratios (national and the four alternative definitions of private saving). We report the full-
sample correlations as well as their cross-section counterparts. As expected, the correlations
are quite high in all cases (between 82 % and 97 %), with the correlations between the
national saving ratio and the private saving ratios being the lowest ones. The five saving
ratios also look very similar in their descriptive statistics (with a mean of about 20%, and
standard deviations of 8 %). The table also highlights the wide dispersion of private saving
ratios, which range from a minimum of-25  percent (Zambia 1985) to a maximum in excess
of 46 percent (Singapore 1984).
3.2 Empirical specification
We adopt an encompassing approach based on reduced-form linear equations.  This
allows us to include a broad range of saving determinants. As dependent variables we use
both private  and national  saving ratios (to gross  private  and  gross national  disposable
income, respectively), although we concentrate on the former.  We focus our attention on a6
"core"  set  of regressors selected on  the basis of  analytical relevance (as  well as  data
availability); however, we also examine the empirical role of a number of less-standard
saving determinants. 10
Following previous  literature,  our  core regressors include  a  standard  group of
income-related variables, namely the (log) level and the rate of growth of real per capita
disposable income, and the terms of trade. To ensure cross-country comparability of real
income figures, we convert the local-currency constant-price GNDI and GPDI data using
World Bank Atlas exchange rates averaged over 1965-94.
In addition, our basic regressors include both price and quantity financial variables.
The latter are the ratio of M2 to GNP, as standard indicator of financial depth, and the
domestic (in national saving regressions) or private (in private saving regressions) credit
flow relative to income, to capture consumers' access to borrowing." 1 The price variable is
the real interest rate, defined as In[(1+i)1(  + r)].  It  is calculated using two alternative
measures of inflation: the current rate and the average of current and  one-period-ahead
inflation. This yields two alternative real interest rate measures, of which our preferred one
is that using the averaged forward-backward inflation just  described; however, we also
present empirical experiments using instead current inflation.
As conventional, we attempt to capture Ricardian effects in private saving equations
by including as regressor the public saving ratio, measured in a way consistent with the
definition of private saving under consideration; however, we also report somne  experiments
adding the public investment / income ratio. In turn, demographic factors are represented by
the old and young-age dependency ratios as well as the proportion of urban population in
the  total.  Finally,  we  attempt  to  capture  precautionary  saving  effects  related  to
macroeconomic uncertainty adding the inflation rate ln(l+±r,)  among the regressors. In this
regard, we follow a rather voluminous literature in which the inflation rate has been used as
a proxy for price uncertainty (Deaton 1977) and, more generally, macroeconomic instability
(e.g., Fischer 1993).
We  perfbrm  additional  empirical  experiments  using  measures  of  trend  and
temporary income  and the terms of trade,  as well as measures of  incorne uncertainty,
constructed from our data.  For this purpose, we use the time-series procedure introduced by
Maravall  and  Planas  (1999). This  procedure yields  separate  series  for  the  trend  and
temporary components of real income and the terms of trade. Combining the respective
trend and temporary components, we can construct one-step ahead forecasts of the original
variables.  The dispersion of the corresponding one-step ahead forecast errors provides a
measure of the volatility of the respective innovations and hence the desired measure of
"uncertainty". As measure of dispersion we use the square of the forecast error.
Table 3 presents basic descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (full-sample
and cross-section) on the private (PA) saving ratio and the core explanatory variables.7
3.3 Econometric Issues
The estimation procedure needs to tackle three issues. First, rather than distort the
available information by phase averaging using an arbitrary phase length (e.g., computing 5
or 10-year averages), we choose to work with the original annual data in order to retain all
the information. This in turn means that we need to use a dynamic specification in order to
allow for inertia, very likely to be present in the annual information.  Inertia in saving rates
can arise from lagged effects of the explanatory variables on saving.  Thus, considering a
dynamic specification allows us to discriminate between short- and long-run  effects on
saving. 12 Second, some of the explanatory variables in the core specification above (e.g.,
the real interest rate, real income growth, etc.) are likely to be jointly determined with the
saving  rate;  therefore,  we  must  allow  and  control  for  the  joint  endogeneity  of  the
explanatory variables. Third, we must also allow for the possible presence of unobserved
country-specific  effects correlated with the regressors.
To address these issues, our empirical analysis is based on Generalized-Method-of-
Moments estimators applied to dynamic models using panel data.  These estimators allow
us to  control  for unobserved  country-specific effects and  potential  endogeneity of  the
explanatory variables. 1 3
Before we  proceed,  we  must  clarify the  extent  to  which  we  control  for joint
endogeneity. Our panel estimator controls for endogeneity by using "internal instruments,"
that is, instruments based on lagged values of the  explanatory variables.  Through this
method we can relax the assumption that the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous;
however, we cannot allow for full endogeneity of the explanatory variables.  To be precise,
we must assume that the explanatory variables are "weakly exogenous," which means that
they can be  affected by  current  and past  realizations  of  the  saving  rate  but  must  be
uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term.  Conceptually, weak exogeneity does
not mean that future saving rates cannot be correlated with current realizations of variables
such as income growth or the interest rate (as would be predicted by most forward-looking
models). Rather, weak exogeneity means that future innovations (or unforeseen changes) to
the saving rate do not  influence previous  realizations of the  saving determinants.  We
believe that conceptually this assumption is not particularly restrictive; furthermore, we can
examine its validity statistically through several specification tests, as explained below.
The following is a brief presentation of our preferred methodology. Consider the
following dynamic reduced-form saving regression equation,
Sit  =(SO  +±O'  X0  +±  +  (1)
where s is the saving rate, X represents a set of variables that potentially affect the saving
rate, rI represents a set of unobserved time-invariant country-specific effects, c is the error
term, and the subscripts i and t represent country and time period, respectively. 14
The usual method for dealing with the country-specific effect in the context of panel
data has been to first-difference the regression equation (Anderson and Hsiao 1982). In this8
way the country-specific effect is directly eliminated from the estimation process.  First-
differencing equation (1), we obtain,
sj  - Si,,-, = a(si,,  - t-2 ) + 0(X,,  - Xi,,-,) +  - (2)
The use of instruments is required to account for two facts.  First, differencing the
saving regression introduces, by construction, a correlation between the differenced lagged
saving rate and the differenced error term.  Second, some of the explanatory variables, X,
may be jointly endogenous with the saving rate.  In particular, we would like to relax the
commonly held assumption that all explanatory variables are strictly exogenous (that is, that
they  are uncorrelated with  the  error  term,  E,  at  all  leads  and  lags).  Relaxing  this
assumption allows for the possibility of simultaneity and reverse causality, which are very
likely present in saving regressions.  As explained above, we adopt the assumption of weak
exogeneity of  the  explanatory variables,  in  the  sense  that  they  are  assumed  to  be
uncorrelated with  future realizations of the error term (see  Chamberlain. 1984). In  this
presentation of the methodology, all variables are treated as weakly exogenous (with respect
to  ).  In practice, however, we treat  some variables as strictly exogenous (again, with
respect to £ ); they are the young and old dependency ratios, the urbanization ratio, and the
terms of trade.
Under the assumptions that (a) the error term, e,  is not serially corTelated,  and (b)
the explanatory variables, X, are weakly exogenous, the following moment conditions apply
to the lagged saving rate and the set of explanatory variables,'5
ELsils(£-,,,-£it-1  )J=  0  for s > 2;  t = 3,...,  T  (3)
E[X 11 X  .(£i  i t-~ 1 t)]  =  0  fors>2;t=3,...,T  (4)
We use a consistent GMM estimator based on these moment conditions, that we label the
difference estimator.
There are, however, conceptual and  statistical shortcomings with  this estimator.
Conceptually, we would like to study not only the time-series relationsh,ip between the
saving  rate  and  its  determinants  but  also  their  cross-country  relationship,  which  is
eliminated in the case of the simple difference estimator.  Statistically, Alonso-Borrego and
Arellano (1996) and Blundell and Bond (1997) show that when the explanatory variables
are persistent over  time, lagged levels of these variables are weak  instruments for the
regression equation in differences.  The instruments' weakness has negative repercussions
on both the asymptotic efficiency and the small-sample bias of the difference estimator.' 6
To confront these conceptual and statistical concerns, we use an alternative system
estimator that  reduces the  potential  biases  and  imprecision associated  with  the  usual
difference estimator (Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1997).  The alternative
estimator combines, in a system, the regression in differences with the regression in levels.
The instruments for the regression in differences are the same as above (i.e., the lagged
levels of the corresponding variable), so that, the moment conditions in equations (3) and
(4) apply to this first part of the system. For the second part of the system, the regression in9
levels, the instruments are given by the lagged differences of the corresponding variables.
These are appropriate instruments under the following additional assumption: although
there may be correlation between the levels of the right-hand side variables and the country-
specific effect in  equation (1), there is  no correlation between the  differences of these
variables and  the  country-specific effect.  This  assumption results  from  the  following
stationarity property,
E[s,. 1+p  .rE]= E[s 11±q .1]  for  all  p  and  q  (5)
E[X't+P 77j]=  E[Xi,+q .']  for  all  p  and  q  (6)
Therefore, the additional moment conditions 17 for the second part of the system (the
regression in levels) are given by the following equations 18:
E[(si-  t-l-Si-2  H)*  (i  + 8 ,t  )]  =  0  (7)
E[(Xi,t  - Xi't-l  ) *  (77  i +  e iat  )] =  °  (8)
We use the moment conditions presented in the above equations, and, following
Arellano and Bond  (1991) and  Arellano and  Bover  (1995), we employ  a  Generalized
Method  of  Moments  (GMM)  procedure19  to  generate  consistent  estimates  of  the
parameters of interest.
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on whether lagged values of the
explanatory variables are valid instruments in the saving regression. 20 To address this issue
we consider three specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and
Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1997).  The first is a Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions, which tests  the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample
analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process.  Failure to reject the null
hypothesis gives support to the model.  The second test is the "difference-Sargan" test,
which examines the null hypothesis that the lagged differences of the explanatory variables
are uncorrelated with the residuals (which are the additional restrictions imposed in the
system estimator with respect to the difference estimator).21  The third test examines the
hypothesis that the  error term  Eit is not serially correlated or, if it is correlated, that it
follows a finite-order moving average process.  We test whether the differenced error term
(that is, the residual  of the  regression in  differences) is first-,  second-, and third-order
serially correlated.  First-order serial correlation of the differenced error term is expected
even if the original error term (in levels) is uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a random
walk.  Second-order serial correlation of the differenced residual indicates that the original
error term is serially correlated and follows a moving average process at least of order one.
If the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of absence of second-order serial correlation, we
conclude that the original error-term is  serially uncorrelated and  use the corresponding
moment conditions. 22
Measurement  error.  The  discussion  above has  abstracted from  issues  regarding
measurement error.  It is likely, however, that most variables in our econometric model
suffer from measurement error.  Given that our model is dynamic, not only errors in the
explanatory variables will cause biased estimation but also errors in the saving rate, the10
dependent variable. We can deal with measurement error through our instrumental variable
procedure. We allow for measurement error of two kinds. The first type is mostly constant
over time but specific to each country.  We group this type of error with the unobserved
country specific effect and control for it accordingly.  The second type of measurement
error we allow for is the standard random error.  If this is serially uncorrelated, it can be
shown that the same lag structure for the instruments that control for endogeneity also deals
with  measurement error.  If the random measurement error follows  a  rnoving average
process of order  1, then we need to use instruments lagged one more period than what
would be necessary if there were no measurement error (or if it were seriall-y  uncorrelated).
In practice for all private saving rate regressions, we take the conservative approach of
allowing for measurement error that follows an MA(l)  process (see footnote 22).  The
specification tests for the validity of the instruments can also be used to assess whether the
control for measurement error is appropriate.
4.  Estimation results
We now present the estimation results for private and national saving rates.  In each
case, we organize our discussion around the core empirical specification introduced above.
As  noted earlier, the core regressors are the same for private  and national saving rate
regressions except for the fact that government saving is included only in private saving
equations. We  focus on the private saving rate, and  concentrate on the private  saving
measure that is most analytically sound. This is the measure that corresponds to the public
sector defined broadly to  include regional and  local governments and, where  possible,
public enterprises, and adjusting for capital gains and losses due to inflation.
In  order  to  test  the  robustness  of  the  basic  results  and  to  enlighten  their
interpretation, we  also conduct experiments along four dimensions.  First,  we employ
alternative econometric techniques.  Second, we use alternative samples: we break the
world sample into OECD and developing-country subsamples, and we also present a world
sample that excludes potential outliers.  Third, we work with  alternative definitions of
private saving.  And, fourth, we explore the importance of additional explanatory variables.
Finally, we consider national saving regression results obtained under various econometric
techniques.
Before proceeding to the detailed discussion of the results in Tables 4-8, we note
that the specification tests generally support our GMM-IV panel estimates.  I[n  all cases, the
Sargan  test  of  overidentifying restrictions  cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  the
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.  Likewise, the tests of serial correlation
reject the hypothesis that the error term is third-order serially correlated (and, in most cases,
that  it  is  second-order  serially  correlated),  giving  additional  support  to  the  use  of
appropriate lags of the explanatory variables as instruments for the estimation. For the core
regression (Table 4,  column  6),  we also  conduct the  Sargan-difference test, which  as
explained above tests the validity of the additional restrictions imposed by the system
estimator relative to the difference estimator.  In agreement with the conclusions of the
other two  specification tests,  the  Sargan-difference test  does  not  reject the  additional
restrictions of the system estimator (p-value 0.59).I1
Prior to presenting the results, we must clarify their interpretation.  Our econometric
methodology  is  designed to  isolate  the  effect  of  the  exogenous  component  of  each
explanatory variable on the saving rate.  To the extent that our assumptions regarding the
instruments employed in  the GMM procedures are correct, we  succeed in  isolating the
effects going from the explanatory variables to the saving rate.  The specification tests
presented above support  the  validity of  our  instruments and,  thus,  allow  us to  draw
inferences regarding the link between the exogenous component of policy and non-policy
variables and saving rates. In the following, when we mention the effect  of a given variable
on the private  saving rate,  we are referring to  the  association between  the exogenous
component of that variable and the saving rate.
4.1 Basic results
Table 4 reports the results of the private  saving rate regression using alternative
estimators on the  full sample and employing the core specification. While there  are a
number of similarities among the various estimates, as explained in the previous section our
preferred estimation method uses the GMM system estimator. Hence we first discuss the
results obtained with this estimator (column 6) and then compare them with those obtained
with alternative estimation methods.
Persistence.  The  lagged  private  saving  rate  has  a  positive  and  significant
coefficient, whose size (0.59) reveals a large degree of persistence.  This, in turn, implies
that the long-run effects of other private saving determinants are more than twice (2.44
times, to be exact) as large as their respective short-run effects -- if all changes in these
variables were permanent.
Income.  Both  the  (log)  level  and  the  growth rate  of  real  per  capita private
disposable income have a positive and significant effect on the private  saving rate --as
private  agents become  richer or their incomes grow faster, their saving  rate  increases.
According to the estimated coefficients, an increase in  income by 10 percent raises the
private saving rate by 0.47 percentage points on impact.  In turn, the estimated growth
coefficient indicates that an increase in the income growth rate by 1 percentage point leads
to a private saving rate increase of 0.45 percentage points in the short run. Lastly, a  10
percent  improvement in  the  terms  of  trade  increases the  private  saving  rate  by  0.74
percentage points in the short run.
In our basic regression specification, we estimate the effect of changes in income
levels and growth rates and in the terms of trade; however, we cannot tell whether the
estimated effects are due to permanent or temporary changes in these variables.  We return
to  this  issue  below,  when  we  attempt  a  decomposition of  these  variables  into  their
permanent and temporary elements.  In so far as the estimated coefficients represent the
saving effects of temporary  changes in income levels and growth rates, their positive sign is
consistent with standard intertemporal consumption theories.  If they represent the effect of
permanent  changes in income levels and growth rates, their positive sign must be explained
resorting to more recent theoretical developments.  Thus, the positive income level effect
would be consistent with models of subsistence consumption, while the positive income12
growth effect could be explained by a model featuring consumption habits or the life-cycle
model where income growth accrues mostly across cohorts.
On the whole, the significant effects of income levels and growth rates imply that
policies that spur development are an indirect but most effective way to raise saving.  To
the extent that a. significant fraction of the increased saving is channeled into productive
domestic investment in many countries (as suggested by the evidence in support of the co-
movement of saving and investmnent  first underscored by Feldstein and  lHorioka  ,1980),
successful growth policies may be able to set in motion a virtuous cycle of saving, capital
accumulation, and growth.
Financial variables. The real interest rate has  a negative impact on the private
saving rate, suggesting that  its income effect outweighs the sum of its  substitution and
humnan-wealth  effects.  A 1 percentage point increase in the real interest rate produces a
private saving rate decline of about 0.25 percentage points in the short run. This result
should be taken with some caution, however, in view of the strong negative correlation
between inflation and the real interest rate (Table 3), which suggests that our real interest
rate measure may reflect more the action of nominal interest rate controls and financial
repression than consumers'  intertemporal rate  of  substitution. In turn,  our indicator of
financial depth (M2/GNP) has a small and statistically insignificant impactl  on the private
saving rate. Other experiments using instead credit ratios to measure financial depth led to
similar results. Finally, the flow of private domestic credit relative to  income carries a
negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that the relaxation of credit constraints leads
to decrease in the private saving rate (in agreement with evidence given by Jappelli and
Pagano 1995). When the flow of private credit rises by  1 percent of income, the private
saving rate decreases by 0.32 percentage points on impact.
These results provide a bleaker view of the saving effects of financial liberalization
than suggested by previous studies, in both the price and quantity dimensions: both higher
interest rates and larger private domestic credit flows exert a negative effect  on private
saving rates. Although on the whole we do not find any positive, direct effects of financial
liberalization on saving rates, there is considerable evidence that financial reforn  has a
positive impact on growth (e.g., Levine, Loayza and Beck 2000) and, through this channel,
a potentially important indirect effect on saving rates.
Fiscal policy.  A rise in the public saving ratio leads to a statistically significant
decline in the private saving rate.  Specifically, the private sector reduces its saving rate by
0.29 percentage points for each 1 percentage point increase in the public saving ratio within
the same year the policy change occurs.  Over the long term, however, the offset coefficient
rises to 0.69. Therefore a permanent rise in public saving by 4% of GNDI will raise national
saving by 2.8% of GNDI within a year, but only by some 1.2% of GNDI in the long tern.
The former result is at the low end of previous estimates, while the latter is alt  the upper end,
so that allowing for inertia in saving helps reconcile some conflicting estimates found in the
literature (see Lopez, Schmidt-Hebbel and  Serven 2000). While our point estimates fall
short of unity, a Wald test of the null of fall long-run Ricardian offsetting yields a p-value
of .10, which provides some evidence against the Ricardian hypothesis but -fails  to reject it
at conventional significance levels.13
Demographic  variables.  All  three  demographic variables  under  consideration,
namely, the urbanization ratio and the young and old dependency ratios, have a significantly
negative impact on the private saving rate. The negative effect of the urbanization ratio can
be explained along the precautionary-saving motive -- lacking the means to diversify away
the high uncertainty of their mostly agricultural income, rural residents tend to save a larger
proportion  of  their  income.  The  negative  coefficients  on  the  dependency  ratios  are
consistent with standard life-cycle models of consumption. The null of equality of estimated
coefficients is rejected -- the coefficient on the old dependency ratio is significantly larger
than that on the young dependency ratio. This likely reflects the fact that the labor force
effectively includes a non-negligible proportion of the population aged under 16 (the cutoff
point for the young dependency ratio) in many countries.
Both  urbanization  and  the  old-age  dependency  ratio  are  strongly  positively
correlated with per capita income (Table 3), so that they contribute to dampen the positive
effect of rising incomes on saving noted above. In turn, the negative saving effect of young-
age dependency suggests that developing countries with young populations that  aim at
accelerating their demographic transition and speed up the decline in young-age dependency
ratios, may witness a transitory increase in their saving ratios before reaching the next stage
of demographic maturity.  At this stage old-age dependency rises swiftly --and saving rates
level off again.
Macroeconomic uncertainty.  Like in much of the recent growth literature, in the
core specification our proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty is the inflation rate. We find
that a rise in inflation has a positive coefficient: a reduction of inflation by 10 percentage
points reduces the private saving by over  1 percentage point through this  channel. This
suggests that increased macro uncertainty (regarding for example nominal incomes, future
policies and so on) induces people to save a larger fraction of their income for precautionary
motives.23 While one might be tempted to conclude that inflation stabilization could have
an adverse effect on saving, it is important to keep in mind that stabilization also affects
saving through other indirect channels that are likely to more than compensate for any
negative direct effect of inflation.  In this regard, there is systematic evidence that lower
inflation raises growth (see Fischer 1993, Andres and Hernando 1997, among many other
studies) and, as discussed below, the latter has a major positive effect on private saving.
Further,  the  fiscal-adjustment component  of  macroeconomic  stabilization  also  has  an
unambiguously  positive effect on national saving, as noted above.
4.2 Alternative Estimators
Table 4 also presents results obtained with alternative estimation techniques. The
first two columns present static OLS estimates, using respectively the cross-section data
(i.e.,  country  averages)  and  the  pooled  annual  data.  Both  specifications  are  often
encountered in saving studies. The third column adds the lagged dependent variable to the
second. It is important to keep in mind, however, that in all three cases OLS is likely biased
and  inconsistent  because  it  ignores  unobserved  country-specific  effects  and  joint
endogeneity of the explanatory variables.  In the fourth column, the Within estimator is
used  to  control  for  country-specific effects,  but  still  ignoring joint  endogeneity. An14
additional problem already noted earlier is that the presence of a lagged dependent variable
renders the within estimator inconsistent in  short panels, although its  fate in  a heavily
unbalanced panel such as ours is somewhat less clear. The fifth column presents the results
obtained with the GMM estimator based on a regression in differences which, as explained
earlier, deals with country-specific effects and joint  endogeneity.  However, the GMM
difference estimator eliminates the cross-country variation of the data  (like the Within
estimator) and may suffer from small-sample bias due to the use of weak instruments.  By
contrast, the system GMM estimator in column 6 makes use of both cross-country and time-
series information.
In many cases, the results obtained with our preferred estimation technique, the
GMM system estimator, are qualitatively similar to  those  obtained with  the alternative
estimators shown in  Table 4. All estimators yield positive effects of the (log) level and
growth rate of real income and negative effects of public saving and the old dependency
ratio - although the coefficients vary in size and statistical significance. Likewise, in all
cases (with the obvious exception of the static OLS estimates) we find significant evidence
of private saving inertia, although likely exaggerated in the pooled OLS estimates due to
their lack of control for country-specific effects.
There are.,  however, some notable exceptions.  For example, the use of time series
information (columns 2-6) reverses the parameter signs of the terms of trade and credit
flows relative to those found in the cross-section OLS estimates. By contrast, cross-section
information (columns 1-3 and 6) is needed to  obtain a significant negative effect of the
urbanization ratio. In turn, controlling for country-specific effects (columns 4-6) reverses
the sign of the M2/GDP ratio from positive to negative. In this regard, however, notice that
M2/GNP is likely to be a better proxy for financial depth in the cross-section dimension
than in the annual time-series dimension, where it may reflect mostly other short-term
factors like monetary policy. Finally, the sign and significance of the coefficients of the
inflation rate and the interest rate do not show a clear pattern across alternative estimators.
4.3 Alternative samples
In  Table  5, we  present the  GMM  system estimates for  alternative  samples of
countries,  namely, the  sample  of  less-developed countries  (LDC)  and  the  sample  of
industrial countries (OECD), in addition to the full-sample estimates already described. We
also present estimates for a sample that excludes outliers without resorting to bounds on
inflation. We obtain this sample by restricting the observations of each variable in the core
specification to lie between 4 standard deviations from the respective mean.  The estimated
results for the restricted sample are quite similar to  those obtained with the full sample
(which, as explained above, imposes a 50% bound on inflation).  We take this similarity as
evidence that our core regression results are not driven by outlier observations and that the
inflation bound is not distorting the estimation results.
Qualitatively, the estimates obtained on the subsamples of developing and industrial
countries are broadly similar to their full-sample counterparts, but there are two important
exceptions. First, surprisingly, the coefficient on the real interest rate is not significant for
either the OECD or LDC samples, while it was significantly negative in the full sample.15
This again raises the suspicion that the accuracy with which real interest rates measure
intertemporal prices varies across the two subsamples. 24 Likewise, M2/GNP is the other
variable whose sign is not robust across samples: negative and insignificant in the full
sample, positive and  insignificant in the LDC sample, and  significantly positive in  the
OECD sample.
There are also some changes in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients across
samples. The level of private income and its rate of growth are always positively related to
the private saving rate, but their estimated coefficients are smaller in the OECD (where the
level effect is in fact insignificant, a pattern already found by Modigliani 1992) than in the
LDC sample.  This seems consistent with subsistence-consumption theories, which predict
a higher impact of income and growth on saving rates at low levels of income. The size of
the estimated coefficients of the demographic variables is uniformly smaller in the case of
the OECD sample than in the LDC and full samples. This result likely reflects non-linear
saving effects of the demographic variables, as well as the  greater homogeneity across
OECD populations in terms of urbanization and age structure. The private credit flow ratio
also carries a considerably larger coefficient in the LDC subsample than in  the OECD
subsample. This is possibly due to the fact that credit constraints in developed countries are
mostly non-binding, and therefore increases in private credit flows in these countries do not
reflect improved credit availability.
Finally, it is puzzling that the coefficient on the public saving rate is found to be
larger in the group of developing countries than in the OECD subsample. We would expect
that the conditions for Ricardian equivalence to hold are more prevalent in industrial than in
developing countries.  The large estimated coefficient on the public saving ratio for the
group of LDCs may reveal that, despite our best efforts, measurement error is partly driving
the negative correlation between private and public saving rates.  This is a likely possibility
given that private saving was derived as the difference between national and public saving -
-any error in public saving would translate mechanically in an error of the opposite sign in
private saving.  If we assume the estimated public saving coefficient for the OECD sample
as mostly free from measurement error, then we find a larger effect of public saving on
national saving than reported above. A permanent increase in public saving of 4% of GNDI
would lead to an increase in national saving of 3.6% of GNDI in the short run and 2.6% of
GNDI  in  the  long  run.  Interestingly, for  both  the  industrial  and  developing  country
subsamples, Wald tests allow clear rejection of full long-run Ricardian offsetting, with p-
values below I percent.
4.4 Alternative definitions of the public sector
Table  6  presents  full-sample  system-GMM  estimation  results  using  the  four
alternative definitions of the public sector introduced earlier. Up to now we have focused on
the public  sector definition that  includes the  general government and,  when  available,
public enterprises; furthermore, the related saving and income data have been adjusted to
account for the inflationary erosion of privately-held public liabilities.  The results of this
core regression, discussed above, are reproduced in Table 6, column 4, under the heading of
"PA."  The other columns make use instead of the three alternative public- (and private-)
sector saving measures introduced earlier corresponding to, respectively, unadjusted central16
government (CU, column 1), adjusted central government (CA, column 2), and unadjusted
consolidated public  sector (PU,  colurn  3).  25  Performing this  robustness  check  for
alternative public-sector measures is important given that differences in empirical results
across different studies have often been attributed to differences in public sector definition.
Surprising to us, the estimated results are remarkably robust across definitions of the
public sector.  Concerning the adjusted and unadjusted data, this  is not all that  striking
given that we have dropped from the sample the observations corresponding to extreme
inflation  episodes.  In  any  case,  Table  6  shows  only  one  exception  that  deserves
discussion.26  The estimated coefficient on public saving is larger in the central government
regressions than in  those corresponding to the consolidated public  sector.  In fact, the
"offset" coefficient is about 25% larger in the case of the central government, so that in the
long run it reaches 72% and 95% in the CU and CA specifications, respectively, in contrast
with the 58% and 69% that results from the PU and PA estimates.  The straightforward
explanation of this  result is that there  is a  larger degree of  offset between the central
government and other public-sector levels (provincial and  state governments and public
enterprises) thain  between the consolidated public sector and the private sector. This in turn
implies that studies of Ricardian equivalence based on a central-government definition of
the public sector tend to overstate the public-private saving offset.
4.5 Additional explanatory variables
In Table 7, we add other potential private saving determinants, excluded from the
'core" set  of explanatory variables because they are either  less commonly used  in the
literature or not well justified conceptually.  We consider each variable inl  turn.  The first
one is the current account deficit (relative to private disposable income).  While popular in
the literature, the current account deficit is a somewhat dubious regressor, as it is jointly
determined with saving in countries and/or at time periods characterized by unrestricted
access to net foreign lending, and is exogenously determined otherwise. Thus, it is difficult
to  interpret the  results  obtained with  this  variable when  using  samples that  combine
observations on the two regimes (like ours and most others).  In our case, we try to correct
at least in part for these problems by treating the current account ratio as an endogenous
variable in  our  GMM-IV procedure. The resulting estimates  show that  an  increase in
external saving (i.e., a worsening of the current account deficit) is partly offset by a decline
of private saving; the offset coefficient is on the order of 33% in the short run, and about
60% in the long run. At face value, the implication is that an increase by, say, 2% of GNDI
in the exogenous component of foreign lending reduces private saving by approximately
1.2% of GNDI in the long run. With the important caveat just noted, this agrees with the
standard view that external saving acts as a  substitute rather than as a  complement to
domestic private saving. The remaining coefficients show little change, although that on
income growth becomes smaller in size.
The second variable is the ratio ofpublic  investment to private disposable income. If
public investment is perceived to be just like public consumption, its estirmated  coefficient
would be of equal magnitude but opposite sign as that for the public saving ratio.  If it is
viewed as productive investment, its coefficient would be zero. What we obtain, however,
is a significantly negative coefficient.  This suggests a somewhat puzzling complementarity17
between public and private goods, in the sense that an increase in government investment
leads to an increase in private consumption.  As before, the rest of the parameter estimates
show little variation.
The third variable is the proxy for income uncertainty mentioned earlier, constructed
as the standard error of the one-period-ahead forecast error from  a univariate time-series
model  for  income  based  on  Maravall  and  Planas  (1999).27  Although  its  estimated
coefficient has the positive sign expected from the precautionary saving motive, it is not
statistically significant, likely reflecting the rudimentary nature of our constructed proxy.
Fourth, we consider the effect of the oil shocks on private  saving by including dummy
variables for the years 1973, 1974, 1979, and 1980. Although the estimated coefficients for
the four years are found to be negative (reflecting the predominance of oil importers in our
sample), only those  for the  years  1973 and  1974 are  significantly so; 28 the remaining
coefficients are mostly unchanged. This result indicates that for the typical (oil-importing)
country the temporary income loss due to a rise in oil prices leads to a decrease in saving
rather than a downward adjustment of consumption.
Next, in columns 5 and 6 we analyze the effects of the perrnanent and temporary
components of, respectively, private disposable income and the terms of trade.  Note that
the decomposition procedure causes the  loss of  some observations, which  are used to
estimate the underlying univariate models. Remarkably, in both cases we find that the size
of the coefficient on the temporary component is much larger than that of the permanent
component (although the latter maintains a positive sign). In the case of income, neither
coefficient is significant, while both are in the case of the terms of trade. 29 a The larger
impact on the saving rate of temporary income is consistent with consumption smoothing
by forward-looking agents. In turn, the fact that the permanent component of the terms of
trade retains a  significant positive coefficient (although much  smaller than that  on the
temporary component) might reflect the lack of access to external borrowing that many
developing countries suffered during much of our sample period.
Finally, in column 7 we reexamine the effect of the real interest rate on saving by
using in its calculation the current inflation rate, rather than the average of the current and
next-year inflation rates, as done up to now.  The sign and significance of the real interest
rate coefficient remain as before, though its magnitude is larger. The remaining parameters
are mostly unaffected, but the inflation rate now adopts a negative, though insignificant,
coefficient, reflecting the strong correlation (-0.70) between the ex-post real interest rate
and the inflation rate. This suggests that the larger coefficient on the former variable may be
capturing in part the positive effect of inflation on the private saving rate found earlier.
4.6 National  saving  rate
Table 8 presents the full-sample results for national saving rate regressions obtained
with alternative estimators.  The table is analogous to Table 4, on the private saving rate,
except for the fact that in the national saving rate regressions we do not include the public
saving ratio as an explanatory variable.  The maintained assumption in the national saving
rate regressions is that the public saving rate is driven by the same determinants as the
private saving rate (excluding public saving itself, of course).  In spite of the much larger18
data samples used here, close comparison between these results and those obtained with the
private saving rate reveals a remarkable similarity in terms of sign and significance of the
estimated coefficients. Indeed, our preferred (GMM-system) estimates azre  basically the
same for the private and national saving rates, with three differences of some relevance.
First, the real interest rate still carries a negative coefficient, but it is not significant in the
national saving rate regressions; second, the effect of the level of income is much larger in
the case of the national saving rate; and third, the degree of persistence is lower for national
than for private saving rates. In turn, the results obtained using alternative estimators are
also quite similar for both dependent variables. We take this broad similarity, along with the
fact that the theoretical literature provides a framework for the analysis of private saving
decisions, as supportive of our choice to concentrate on the empirical determinants of the
private saving rate.
5.  Concluding Remarks
Private and national saving rates display very large variation across countries and
over time. This paper has  explored empirically the roles  of policy variables  and other
factors  in  these  large  saving  disparities.  The paper  extends  the  literature  in  several
dimensions. First, it makes use of a new data set on saving and related macroeconomic
variables, whose coverage in terms of countries and years is considerably broader than those
used in previous literature. Second, it explores different dimensions of saving -- of the
private sector and the nation. Third, it tries to correct for issues such as simultaneity and
unobserved country-specific effects, making use of instrumental variable estimators based
on "internal" instruments. Fourth, it performs extensive robustness checks to changes in
estimation  procedures,  country  samples,  private-saving  measures,  and  empirical
specifications.
The main empirical findings reported in the paper are the following:
- Private saving rates show inertia, that is, they are highly serially correlated even
after controlling for other relevant factors. The effects of a change ina  a given saving
determinant are thus fully realized only after a  number of years., with  long run
responses estimated to be more than two times larger than short-run (within a year)
ones.
*  Private saving rates rise with the level and growth rate of real per capita income.
The influjence  of income is larger in developing than in developed countries.  In
developing countries a doubling of income per capita is estimated, other things
equal, to raise the long-run private saving rate by some  10 percentage points  of
disposable income. Likewise, a 1 percentage-point rise in the growth rate raises the
private saving rate by a similar amount. The overall implication is that policies that
spur development are an indirect but effective way to raise private saving rates.
*  The predictions of the life-cycle hypothesis are supported in that dependency ratios
have a negative effect on private saving rates. The negative impact of an increase in
the  old-dependency ratio  is  more  than  twice  as  large  as  that  of  the  young-
dependency ratio.19
*  The precautionary motive for saving is  supported by the finding that inflation -
conventionally taken as a summary measure of macroeconomic volatility - has a
positive impact on private saving, holding other factors constant.
*  Fiscal policy is a moderately effective tool to raise national saving.  An increase in
public saving by, say, 4% of GNDI will raise national saving by 2.8% of GNDI
within a year, but only by some 1.2% of GNDI in the long term. The evidence points
against full Ricardian equivalence.
*  The direct effects of financial liberalization are largely detrimental to private saving
rates.  First, enhanced credit availability reduces the private saving rate.  Second,
larger financial depth does not raise saving, and nor do higher real interest rates.
These results  are, in general, robust to the use of  alternative saving  definitions,
regression specifications, and data subsamples.
lIn  a companion paper, L6pez, Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel  and Serven (1998b) provide a detailed description of
the basic  data set,  including  descriptive  statistics  and stylized  facts.
2 We note from the outset that these equations are anchored in private consumption (or saving) theory. When
applying  the model  to national  saving  measures  we implicitly  assume  that public  saving  is determined  by the
variables that drive private saving.  We, thus, abstract from a separate behavioral framework for public-sector
saving.  This is consistent  with  both the standard  practice  of empirical  studies  for aggregate  (national)  saving
and the lack of an established theory of public saving.
3  A detailed  discussion  of expected  signs  of saving  determinants  in Table 1 and how they relate to specific
consumption  theories  is  in  Loayza,  Lopez,  Schmidt-Hebbel and  Serven  (1998b).  Further  reviews  of
consumption  hypotheses  and their relation  to empirical  findings  can be found  in Schmidt-Hebbel  and Serven
(1997, 1999).
4L Like in other areas of empirical  work, consumption  studies  face a steep trade-off  in the choice  between
closed-form solutions rigorously  derived from  (typically narrow) consumption optimization models,  and
atheoretical specifications encompassing a  large number of  consumption determinants.  In  line with the
objectives of this paper, here we limit our attention to international studies using panel data and based on the
latter approach.
5 Full details on data sources are given in the companion paper by Loayza et al. (1998a).
6  The reason is that minor changes in the computation method (e.g., regarding the time within each year at
which prices and public debt are measured) can result in huge changes in the adjusted saving measures.
7 As robustness check, we worked with an alternative bound of 75% annual inflation. This reduces the number
of observations discarded (14 instead of 49) and leads to estimates very similar to those reported in the paper,
but at the cost of reduced precision.  A second robustness check (presented in the section on "alternative
samples" in the main text) consisted of restricting the  sample so that the data points  for each variable lie
between 4 standard deviations from the respective mean.  The corresponding estimation results are quite
similar to those obtained with the 50% inflation bound.  In turn, raising the threshold for each variable to 5
standard deviations leads to estimates and precision analogous to those obtained with the 75% inflation bound.
8  In some variants of the basic specification, actual sample sizes are smaller (as reported in at the bottom of
Tables 4-8 below) due to the more limited data availability on some of the 'additional' regressors.
9  Qualitatively, this departs from convention by adding together current and capital transfers from abroad
(typically, only the former are included in saving measures) -- a decision guided by the fact that they are not
separately available until the late 1970s. Quantitatively, however, this makes little difference because in the
light of the available data capital transfers from abroad appear insignificant for virtually every country and
year, with the only exception of 17 observations, most of them from small-island economies that are anyway20
excluded form the samples used in this paper. See Loayza, L6pez, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (1998a) for
more details.
10 The  limited availability of  good-quality annual informnation  across  countries on  pension systems and
measures of income inequality prevents us from including  these variables in our core specification.
11  Since stocks are typically measured at the end of the year, we compute our ratios to  income using the
average of the current and previous year stocks (the latter having being brought to current year prices). Flows
are in tum obtained as differences of stocks for two consecutive years.
12 While seldom considered in empirical studies, saving inertia can arise directly from consumption habits and
even from consumption smoothing. For example, with a quadratic utility function a la Hall (1978), if income
follows an AR(1) process then saving will also be AR(1).  In our sample, the first-order autocorrelation
coefficient of the private saving rate is 0.88.
13  The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator was proposed by Chamberlain (1984), Holtz-
Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995), and has been
applied to cross-country studies by, among others, Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996), Easterly, Loayza and
Montiel (1997), and Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (1998).  For a  concise presentation of the  GMM
estimator, see chapter 8 of Baltagi (1995).
14  Time dunmmies  can also be included in equation (1) to account for time-specific effects.
15 The assumption  that the error tern  is not serially correlated can be relaxed and replaced by the assumption
that it follows a finite-order moving average process.  In this case, the moment conditions must be modified
accordingly. For example, if £  is MA(1) (as it appears to be in some of our private saving regressions below)
the moment conditions in equations (3) and (4) must be replaced by,
E[st-s  (E  1-tl)]  0  for  s>3;  t=3,...,T  (3')
E[X 1- 1 (8't  -s,j)]=0  for  s>3;  t=3,...,T  (4')
16  As the  variables'  persistence  increases, the  asymptotic variance of  the  coefficients obtained  with the
difference estimator rises (that is, the asymptotic precision of this estimator deteriorates).  Furthermore, Monte
Carlo experiments show that the weakness of the instruments produces biased coefficients in small samples.
This bias rises with the variables' over-time persistence and the importance of the country-specific effect and
declines with the  size of  the  time-series dimension.  An  additional problem  with the  simple difference
estimator relates to measurement error, namely, differencing may exacerbate the bias due to errors in variables
by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio (see Griliches and Hausman, 1986).
17 Given that lagged levels are  used as instruments in the  differences specification, only the most  recent
difference is used as instrument in the levels specification. Using other lagged differences would result in
redundant moment conditions (see Arellano and Bover 1995).
18 Equations (7)  and  (8)  give  the  appropriate moment  conditions when the  error  term,  £,  is  serially
uncorrelated.  If, however, the error term follows a moving average process of order 1, then the appropriate
differences to be used as instruments  must be lagged one more period.
'9  We are grateful to Stephen Bond for providing us with a computer program (DPD version 8/8/96) to apply
his and Arellano's estimator to an unbalanced  panel data set.
20 In this paper the moment conditions are applied such that each of them corresponds to all available periods,
as opposed to each moment condition corresponding to a particular time period.  In the former case the
number of moment conditions is independent of the number of time periods, whereas in the latter case, it
increases more than proportionally to the number of time periods.  Most of the literature dealing with GMM
estimators applied to dynamic models of panel data treats the moment conditions as applying to a particular
time period.  This approach is advocated on the grounds that it allows for a more flexible variance-covariance
structure of the moment conditions (see Ahn and Schmidt 1995); such flexibility is achieved without placing a
serious limitation on the degrees of freedom required for estimation of the variance-covariance matrix because
the panels commonly used in the  literature have both a large number of cross-sectional units and  a small
number of time-series periods (typically not more than five).  We have, however, chosen to work with the
more restricted  application of  the moment conditions (each of  them corresponding  to all  available time
periods) because of  a special characteristic of our panel, namely, its  large time-series dimension (well in
excess of the time dimension usually encountered in micro panels).  This approach allows us to work with a
manageable number of  moment conditions, in  a way such that the  second-step estimates, which rely on
estimation of the variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions, do not suffer from over-fitting biases
(see Altonji and Se,al  1994, and Ziliak 1997).21
21  Both the Sargan statistic and the "difference" Sargan statistic are asymptotically distributed as Chi-square
under the null hypothesis of validity of their respective instruments. The number of degrees of freedom of the
Sargan test is equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions of the system estimator.  The number of
degrees of freedom of the "difference" Sargan test is given by the number of additional restrictions in the
system estimator with respect  to the  difference estimator, that  is, the  difference between  the  number of
overidentifying  restrictions of the system estimator and that of the difference estimator.
22  However, if the test rejects the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation but fails to reject the
null of  absence of third-order  serial correlation, we conclude that the  original  error term  is MA(1) and,
therefore, use  the  moment conditions appropriate to this  case.  As  shown below,  in the  private  saving
regressions we find in some cases evidence that the error term  is MA(I)  and, in others, that it is serially
uncorrelated; for purposes of comparability  across regressions we adopt the conservative strategy of choosing
the instrument sets for the regressions as if the error term were always MA(l ).  In the case of national saving,
we fmd that the error term can be well characterized as serially uncorrelated, and we choose the instrument set
accordingly.
23  Deaton (1977) finds the same result but proposes a somewhat different explanation: to the extent that the
increase in inflation is unanticipated, a larger saving rate may result from confusing the increase in the overall
price level with a rise in the relative prices of certain goods.
24 It seems plausible that measured real interest rates are more closely related to intertemporal decisions in the
industrial countries (where the sample mean of the real interest rate is positive) than in developing countries
(where it is negative).
25  The sources of central government data are different from those of public sector data. The former cover
many more countries but fewer years (from 1970 on only). For comparability, all the regressions in the table
use  the same set of  countries, and hence the  central government-based saving regressions possess  fewer
observations.
26  The second exception is that M2/GNP has a positive and significant coefficient only in the  regressions
corresponding to the central government definition of the public sector.
27 Using instead the variance of the forecast error to measure uncertainty yielded similar results.
28 Other year dummies, when added to the regressions, were likewise insignificant.
29  Other experiments using instead the Hodrick-Prescott decomposition yielded qualitatively similar results:
larger coefficients on the temporary than on the pernanent  components of both variables (the latter was in fact
negative for the terms of trade), but in this case all significantly different from zero.22
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Table  1: Determinants  of the Private  Saving  Ratio  to Income  in Previous  Panel  Studies
Variable  Category  Specific  Variable  Expected  Sign  Empirical  Findings
Income  Income  level:  actual  0 or +  + (1,  2, 3, 4)  0 (5, 6)
Temporary  / permanent  + / 0 or +
Terms  of trade: actual  0 or +  + (2, 4,  6)
Temporary  / permanent  + I 0 or +
Growth  rate:  actual  Ambiguous  + (2, 3)  0 (4, 5, 6)
Rates  of return  Interest  rate  Ambiguous  0 (1, 3, 5, 6)  + (2)
Uncertainty  Variance  of innovations  to  +
saving  determinants
Inflation  or other measures  of  +  - (4)  0 (1, 2, 3, 6)
macro  instability
Measures  of political  instability  +
Domestic  borrowing  Private  credit  flows  - + (3)
constraints  Broad  money  flows
Income
Foreign  borrowing  Foreign  lending
constraints  Current  account  deficit  - - (1, 2, 3)
Financial  depth  Private  or domestic  credit  Ambiguous  - (5)
stocks  Ambiguous  + (1, 3, 4)
Money  stocks
Fiscal  policy  Public  saving  - (1, 3)
Public  surplus  - (2, 5, 6)  0 (4)
Public  consumption  Ambiguous  - (2, 6)
Pension  system  Pay-as-you-go  pension  0 or-  - (3, 4, 5)
transfers  to old
Mandatory  fully-funded  0 or +  + (4)
pension system  contributions
Fully  funded  pension  assets  Ambiguous  0 / + (5)
Demographics  Old and/or  young-age  - -(2,  3,  4)  0 (5,  6)
population  dependency
Urbanization  Ambiguous  - (3)
Income  and  wealth  Income  concentration  +  0 (3)
distribution  Wealth  concentration  +
Capital  income  share  +
Note:  the  qualitative  results  listed  in the  last column  of  this table  summarize  significant  signs  of saving  regressors  in  the
corresponding  tables  and columns  of the following  five studies: 1. Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1991) (Table  4); 2.
Masson,  Bayoumi,  and Samiei  (1995)  (Table  2, "restricted  model"  column);  3. Edwards  (1996)  (Table  2, column  5); 4.
Dayal-Ghulati  and  Thimann  (1997)  (Table  4, column  2); 5. Bailliu  and Reisen  (1998)  (Table  1, columns  3 and  4); and
6. Haque,  Pesaran,  and  Sharma  (1999)  (Table  6, columns  4 and  5). Significant  coefficient  signs  are identified  by  a plus
or a minus. Results  identified  by a zero mean  either  an insignificant  coefficient  in the corresponding  column  of the
original  study  or, when  the variable  is omitted  from the particular  specification  reported  in the column,  a significant  or
insignificant  variable  in a different  column  of the  same  table.26
Table  2
Saving measures:  availability  and  basic  properties
(a)  Sample composition
All  LDC  OECD
1970-79  267  132  135
1980-89  436  251  185
1990-95  169  92  77
Total  872  475  397
(b)  Correlation  matrix  of alternative  saving  rate definitions
(IFull  sample:  upper triangle. Cross section:  lower triangle)
GNS  / GNDI  GPSI  GPDI  GPS/  GPDI  GPS/  GPDI  GPSI  GPDI
(PA)  (PU)  (CA)  (CU)
GNS/GNDI  1.00  0.82  0.82  0.85  0.85
GPS/GPDI  (PA)  0.89  1.00  0.95  0.94  0.91
GPS/GPDI  (PU)  0.92  0.96  1.00  0.92  0.96
GPSIGPDI  (CA)  0.94  0.94  0.95  1.00  0.97
GPS/GPDI  (CU)  0.94  0.91  0.97  0.98  1.00
(c) Saving Ratios: Descriptive statistics
(Full  sample)
Mean  Std Dev  Min  Max
GNS/GNDI  0.206  0.075  -0.147  0.486
GPS/GPOI  (PA)  0.193  0.083  -0.253  0.461
GPS/GPDI  (PU)  0.215  0.081  -0.077  0.462
GPS/GPDI  (CA)  0.210  0.085  -0.166  0.457
GPSIGPDI  (CU)  0.226  0.084  -0.166  0.466
Note: Approximate  standard  errors  are  0.031  for the  full-sample  correlations  and  0.118  for the
cross-section  correlations.
GNS  = Gross  National  Saving,  GNDI  = Gross  National  Disposable  Income.
GPS  = Gross  Private  Saving,  GPDI  = Gross  Private  Disposable  Income  (4 alternative
definitions,  as in the  text).27
Table  3
Correlation  matrix  of core  private  saving  determinants
(Full  sample: upper  triangle. Cross  section: lower  triangle)
GPS/  Real  Real  Real int.  M21GNP  Terms of  Urbani-  Old  Young  Gvt.  Pr.Cr.  Inflation
GPDI  GPDI  GPDI  rate  Trade  zation  depen-  depen-  Saving  Flow/GP  rate
Growth  Ratio  dency  dency  IGPDI  Dl
GPS/GPDI  1.00  0.52  0.38  0.22  0.42  0.03  0.36  0.33  -0.51  -0.13  0.21  -0.36
Real GPDI  0.66  1.00  0.12  0.14  0.52  -0.11  0.84  0.83  -0.88  -0.11  0.16  -0.25
Real GPDI growth  0.58  0.41  1.00  0.25  0.14  0.14  0.10  0.06  -0.15  -0.09  0.22  -0.31
Real int. rate  0.41  0.26  0.42  1.00  0.20  0.03  0.12  0.14  -0.23  -0.25  0.23  -0.63
M2/GNP  0.58  0.60  0.52  0.31  1.00  -0.09  0.41  0.48  -0.62  -0.02  0.18  -0.36
Terms of Trade  -0.26  -0.15  -0.01  0.00  -0.05  1.00  -0.03  -0.13  0.10  0.17  0.04  -0.04
Urbanization ratio  0.48  0.87  0.35  0.15  0.48  -0.09  1.00  0.65  -0.75  -0.01  0.14  -0.16
Old dependency  0.48  0.79  0.29  0.18  0.64  -0.11  0.62  1.00  -0.85  -0.18  0.06  -0.24
Young dependency  -0.63  -0.86  -0.46  -0.22  -0.70  0.12  -0.75  -0.87  1.00  0.07  -0.18  0.28
Gvt. Saving / GPDI  0.02  0.13  0.14  0.01  0.09  0.04  0.27  0.00  -0.07  1.00  0.16  0.26
Pr.  Creditflowl  0.59  0.43  0.62  0.29  0.48  -0.05  0.43  0.25  -0.44  0.31  1.00  -0.33
GPDI
Inflation rate  -0.36  -0.20  -0.31  -0.56  -0.48  -0.02  0.01  -0.20  0.18  0.03  -0.23  1.00
DESCRIPTIVE  STATISTICS
(Full  sample)
Mean  Std Dev  Min  Max
GPSIGPDI  0.201  0.081  -0.253  0.461
Real GPDI  7.898  1.314  4.655  9.729
Real GPDI growth  0.019  0.055  -0.317  0.374
Real int. rate  0.000  0.074  -0.404  0.262
M2/GNP  0.491  0.236  0.128  1.466
Terms of Trade  0.017  0.152  -0.765  0.705
Urbanization ratio  0.595  0.229  0.055  1.000
Old dependency  0.129  0.068  0.047  0.276
Young dependency  0.535  0.221  0.227  0.992
Gvt. Saving/GPDI  0.070  0.069  -0.112  0.475
Pr. Credit flow / GPDI  0.032  0.058  -0.210  0.496
Inflation rate  0.089  0.076  -0.379  0.401
Note: Approximate standard errors are 0.034 for the full sample correlations and 0.118
for the cross-section correlations.28
Table  4
Private  saving: Alternative  estimators,  full sample
(Dependent  variable: Gross  private  saving/GPDI)
1  2  3  4  5  6
Estimator  OLS-CS  OLS-Static  OLS-Pool  Within  GMM-Diff  GMM-Syst
Regression  Levels  Levels  Levels  Devia.  Differences  Levs  - Diffs
Instruments  - - - from mean  Levels  Diffs - Levs
Lagged private saving rate  - - 0.832  0.570  0.302  0.587
(28.12)  (14.699)  (3.855)  (9.254)
Real per-capita GPDla  0.046  0.048  0.010  0.068  0.069  0.049
(3.925)  (4.108)  (2.868)  (4.914)  (2.877)  (2.458)
Real growth rate of per-capita GP[)lb  0.480  0.300  0.406  0.340  0.271  0.450
(0.971)  (5.008)  (8.62)  (8.062)  (3.741)  (5.828)
Real interest ratea C  0.154  -0.122  0.032  0.049  -0.401  -0.253
(0.982)  (-1.964)  (1.347)  (1.242)  (-5.588)  (-5.011)
M2/GNP  0.041  0.044  0.012  -0.035  -0.171  -0.020
(1.168)  (1.845)  (1.301)  (-2.227)  (-4.139)  (-0.562)
Terms of tradea  -0.089  0.009  0.006  0.036  0.109  0.078
(-3.142)  (0.468)  (0.848)  (3.661)  (5.676)  (5.096)
Urbanization ratio  -0.127  -0.115  -0.023  0.004  -0.070  -0.382
(-2.5)  (-3.229)  (-1.939)  (0.045)  (-0.508)  (-3.538)
Old dependency ratio  -0.437  -0.623  -0.086  -0.249  -0.168  -0.655
(-2.353)  (-3.477)  (-2.16)  (-2.252)  (-0.638)  (-3.069)
Young dependency ratio  -0.107  -0.143  -0.012  0.104  -0.155  -0.299
(-1.685)  (-2.102)  (-0.815)  (2.437)  (-1.846)  (-4.017)
Government saving/GPDI  -0.201  -0.065  -0.057  -0.154  -0.203  -0.285
(-0.976)  (-0.89)  (-2.367)  (-4.605)  (-2.618)  (-5.097)
Private credit flow/GPDI  0.904  -0.003  -0.129  -0.114  -0.192  -0.318
(2.029)  (-0.058)  (-4.312)  (-3.772)  (-2.188)  (-3.989)
Inflation ratea,C  -0.031  -0.187  0.052  0.123  -0.134  0.143
(-0.212)  (-2.918)  (1.61)  (2.503)  (-1.514)  (2.034)
Wald test of joint significance (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Sargan test (p-value)  - - - - 0.291  0.400
Test for 1st-order serial correlation (p-value)  - 0.000  0.095  0.000  0.033  0.001
Test for 2nd-order serial correlation (p-  - 0.000  0.578  0.922  0.081  0.121
value)
Test for 3d-order serial correlation (p-value)  - 0.000  0.081  0.146  0.873  0.221
Number of observations (Number of  72 (72)  1148 (69)  1079 (69)  1010 (69)  872 (69)  872 (69)
countries)
Notes:  T-statistics (in brackets) computed with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
a  Expressed in logs (log of [1  +x} for the real interest rate and the inflation rate).
b  Measured by the first difference of the log.
c  Both the real interest rate and the inflation rate are bounded between -50  percent and 50 percent.29
Table 5
Private saving:  Alternative samples, system estimator
(Dependent  variable: Gross  private saving/GPDI)
1  2  3  4
Sample  Full  Bounded*  LDC  OECD
Lagged  private  saving  rate  0.587  0.494  0.476  0.674
(9.254)  (10.330)  (17.820)  (12.704)
Real  per-capita  GPDla  0.049  0.035  0.071  0.013
(2.458)  (2.408)  (7.473)  (0.382)
Real  growth  rate  of per-capita  GPDlb  0,450  0.379  0.425  0.285
(5.828)  (6.103)  (13.282)  (2.036)
Real  interest  ratea  C  -0.253  -0.162  0.002  0.020
(-5.011)  (-3.408)  (.084)  (0.313)
M2/GNP  -0.020  -0.007  0.024  0.028
(-0.562)  (-0.262)  (1.001)  (1.989)
Terms  of tradea  0.078  0.060  0.044  0.068
(5.096)  (5.921)  (4.875)  (3.641)
Urbanization  ratio  -0.382  -0.241  -0.240  -0.080
(-3.538)  (-3.452)  (-5.101)  (-1.751)
Old dependency  ratio  -0.655  -0.555  -1.370  -0.218
(-3.069)  (-4.531)  (-4.321)  (-1.42)
Young  dependency  ratio  -0.299  -0.275  -0.279  -0.068
(-4.017)  (-5.607)  (-5.816)  (-0.639)
Government  savinglGPDI  -0.285  -0.172  -0.238  -0.112
(-5.097)  (-3.782)  (-8.333)  (-2.782)
Private  credit  flow/GPDi  -0.318  -0.316  -0.508  -0.085
(-3.989)  (-5.791)  (-9.955)  (-2.427)
Inflation  ratea'  C  0.143  0.127  0.177  0.157
(2.034)  (3.325)  (4.181)  (2.963)
Wald test  of  joint significance  (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Sargan  test (p-value)  0.400  0.174  0.292  0.942
Test  for 1st-order  serial  correlation  (p-value)  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.013
Test  for 2nd-order  serial  correlation  (p-value)  0.121  0.362  0.690  0.157
Test  for 3d-order  serial  correlation  (p-value)  0.221  0.404  0.353  0.889
Number  of observations  (Number  of countries)  872  (69)  845  (73)  475  (49)  397  (20)
Notes: T-statistics  (in  brackets)  computed  with heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors.
*  Observations  more  than  4 Standard  Deviations  away  from mean  of variables  are dropped.
a  Expressed  in logs  (log  of [1  +x] for the  real  interest  rate  and  the  inflation  rate).
b  Measured  by  the  first difference  of the log.
c Both  the  real  interest  rate  and  the inflation  rate are bounded  between  -50 percent  and percent.30
Table 6
Private saving:  Alternative definitions of the private sector, full sample, system estimator
(Dependent  variable: Gross  private  saving/GPDI)
1  2  3  4
Private  sector  definition  CU  CA  PU  PA
Lagged  private  saving  rate  0.593  0.582  0.483  0.587
(11.921)  (13.697)  (6.734)  (9.254)
Real  per-capita  GPDIa  0.046  0.029  0.043  0.049
(3.345)  (1.912)  (2.412)  (2.458)
Real  growth  rate  of per-capita  GPDIb  0.481  0.493  0.472  0.450
(8.943)  (9.969)  (6.274)  (5.828)
Real  interest  ratea  -0.135  -0.108  -0.249  -0.253
(-2.165)  (-1.59)  (-4.949)  (-5.011)
M2/GNP  0.085  0.062  -0.026  -0.020
(3.374)  (2.783)  (-0.787)  (-0.562)
Terms  of  tradea  0.078  0.080  0.062  0.078
(5.324)  (6.529)  (4.500)  (5.096)
Urbanization  ratio  -0.197  -0.104  -0.337  -0.382
(-3.207)  (-1.563)  (-3.481)  (-3.538)
Old  dependency  ratio  -0.873  -0.752  -0.578  -0.655
(-4.934)  (-4.084)  (-3.273)  (-3.069)
Young  dependency  ratio  -0.148  -0.160  -0.321  -0.299
(-2.411)  (-2.732)  (-4.375)  (-4.017)
Government  saving/GPDI  -0.296  -0.388  -0.238  -0.285
(-7.101)  (-10.982)  (-4.437)  (-5.097)
Private  credit  flowlGPDI  -0.297  -0.251  -0.245  -0.318
- (-4.624)  (-4.897)  (-3.392)  (-3.989)
Inflation  ratea  C  0.219  0.247  0.164  0.143
(3.636)  (4.17)  (2.548)  (2.034)
Wald  test of  joint  significance  (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Sargan  test (p-value)  0.356  0.400  0.442  0.400
Test  for 1st-order  serial  correlation  (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.001
Test  for 2nd-order  serial  correlation  (p-value)  0.168  0.190  0.159  0.121
Test  for 3d-order  serial  correlation  (p-value)  0.087  0.099  0.257  0.221
Number  of observations  (Number  of countries)  774  (69)  746 (69)  880 (69)  872  (69)
Notes: T-statistics  (in brackets)  computed  with heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors.
a Expressed  in logs  (log  of (1  +x]  for the real  interest  rate  and  the inflation  rate).
b  Measured  by  the first difference  of the log.
c Both  the real  interest  rate  and  the inflation  rate  are  bounded  between  -50 percent  and 50 percent.31
Table  7
Private saving: Additional  explanatory  variables,  full sample,  system  estimator
(Dependent variable: Gross pfivate savingiGPD!)
1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Additional  variables  Curr.  Acct.  Govt.  Income  Oii  Crisis  Income  TOT  Peer.-  Ex-post
Deficit  Investment Uncertainty Dummy  Perm.-  Temp.  Temp.  Real  int.
Lagged  private  saving  rate  0.435  0.587  0.529  0.614  0.615  0.702  0.577
(10.873)  (14.233)  (13.733)  (12.069)  (12.818)  (17.109)  (9.362)
Real  per-capita  GPDla  0.049  0.025  0.033  0.042  - 0.037  0.038
(3.535)  (1.240)  (1.847)  (2.469)  (2.647)  (1.640)
Real  growth  rate  of per-capita  GPDlb  0.288  0.317  0.417  0.462  0.384  0.381  0.431
(6.117)  (5.25)  (10.652)  (6.516)  (5.494)  (9.085)  (4.679)
Real  interest  ratea  c  -0.143  -0.242  -0.203  -0.223  -0.194  -0.072  -0.386
(-3.774)  (-8.412)  (-6.178)  (-5.328)  (-7.235)  (-2.379)  (-4.213)
M2tGNP  0.028  -0.031  -0.045  -0.011  0.002  0.041  -0.052
(1.192)  (-1.144)  (-1.649)  (-0.363)  (0.084)  (2.000)  (-1.481)
Terms  of tradea  0.041  0.093  0.068  0.069  0.084  - 0.047
(3.946)  (7.374)  (5,747)  (5.960)  (8.469)  (3.605)
Urbanization  ratio  -0.205  -0.271  -0.363  -0.347  -0.283  -0.274  -0.308
(-2.848)  (-3.077)  (-4.269)  (-3.989)  (-3.846)  (-3.774)  (-3.553)
Old  dependency  ratio  -0.95  -1.009  -0.552  -0.593  -0.225  -0.593  -0.653
(-5.841)  (-4.151)  (-4.486)  (-3.637)  (-1.401)  (-3.878)  (-2.510)
Young  dependency  ratio  -0.231  -0.454  -0.397  -0.294  -0.350  -0.204  -0.289
(-5.021)  (-7.084)  (-7.426)  (4.963)  (-6.424)  (-4.924)  (-3.746)
Government  saving/GPDI  -0.306  -0.277  -0.251  -0.286  -0.156  -0.174  -0.297
(-7.073)  (-5.034)  (-5.244)  (-5.423)  (-3.265)  (-4.307)  (-4.528)
Private  credit  flow/GPDI  -0.075  -0.290  -0.246  -0.266  -0.376  -0.378  -0.222
(-1.364)  (-3.726)  (-5.896)  (-3.871)  (-5.805)  (-6.932)  (-2.409)
Inflation  ratea  C  0.107  0.067  0.137  0.175  0.106  0.164  -0.104
(2.506)  (1.525)  (2.893)  (2.742)  (2.556)  (4.420)  (-0.924)
Current account deficit/GPD1  -0.329  - - - - - -
(-9.443)
Government  investment/GPDI  - -0.251  -
(-6.802)
Future income uncertainty proxyd  - - 0.007  -
(0.049)
Oil crisis dumMye  - - - -0.011  -
(-3.770)
Permanent (log) real per capita GPDi  - - - - 0.005
(0.277)
Temporary (log) real per capita GPOI  - - - - 0.160  -
(1.404)
Permanent (log) terms of trade  - - - - - 0.058
(5.298)
Temporary (log) terms of trade  - - - - - 0.177  -
(9.974)
Wald  test  of  joint  significance  (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Sargan  test  (p-value)  0.268  0.475  0.547  0.450  0.918  0.372  0.505
Test  for 1st-order  serial  correlation  (p-value)  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002
Test  for  2nd-order  serial  correlation  (p-value)  0.378  0.159  0.328  0.127  0.287  0.196  0.229
Test  for  3d-order  serial  correlation  (p-value)  0.147  0.129  0.256  0.176  0.125  0.188  0.120
Number  of  observations  (Number  of  872 (69)  673 (62)  777 (60)  872  (69)  779 (62)  858  (66)  872  (69)
countries)
Notes: T-statistics  (in brackets)  computed  with heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors.
a  Expressed  in logs  (log  of [1  +x]  for the real  interest  rate  and  the  inflation  rate).
b  Measured  by  the  first  difference  of the log.
c Both  the  real interest  rate  and  the inflation  rate  are bounded  between  -50 percent  and  50 percent.
d  Square  of one-period  ahead  forecast  error.
e In  the regression  of  Column  4, we considered  4 time  dummies  corresponding  to the  oil crisis  years 1973,  1974,1979  and  1980. Although  all four
coefficients  were  found  to be negative,  only  those  for the  years  1973  and 1974  were  significant.  The  coefficient  reported  in the  table  corresponds  to the
1974  Dummy  variable.32
Table 8
National saving rate: Alternative estimators, full sample
(Dependent  variable: Gross  national  saving/GNDI)
1  2  3  4  5
Estimator  OLS-CS  OLS-Pool  Within  GMM-Diff  GMM-Syst
Regression  Levels  Levels  Devia.  Differences  Levs- Diffs
Instruments  - from mean  Levels  Diffs  - Levs
Lagged  national  saving  rate  - 0.802  0.572  0.378  0.381
(34.2)  (19.054)  (6.143)  (6.650)
Real  per-capita  GNDIa  0.043  0.008  0.064  0.070  0.102
(5.012)  (3.009)  (5.255)  (1.501)  (2.685)
Real  growth  rate  of per-capita  GNDIb  0.878  0.285  0.271  0.249  0.447
(3.216)  (9.459)  (10.07)  (2.573)  (4.831)
Real  interest  ratea  C  0.023  0.0121  0.016  -0.333  -0.136
(0.288)  (0.669)  (0.649)  (-2.503)  (-1.215)
M2/GNP  0.089  0.021  -0.031  -0.154  -0.019
(2.854)  (3.109)  (-2.236)  (-2.504)  (-0.410)
Terms  of tradea  -0.032  0.015  0.045  0.084  0.057
(-1.242)  (2.031)  (4.746)  (5.753)  (5.243)
Urbanization  ratio  -0.044  -0.020  -0.048  0.031  -0.500
(-1.416)  (-2.062)  (-1.107)  (0.383)  (-3.373)
Old dependency  ratio  -0.571  -0.133  -0.480  -0.343  -0.772
(-3.537)  (-3.409)  (-4.599)  (-1.225)  (-1.687)
Young  dependency  ratio  -0.016  -0.020  0.051  -0.066  -0.156
(-0.365)  (-1.985)  (2.100)  (-.823)  (-2.236)
Domestic  credit  flow/GNDI  0.061  -0.118  -0.107  -0.365  -0.359
(0.209)  (-4.508)  (-4.473)  (-3.764)  (-4.136)
Inflation  ratea.  C  -0.012  0.104  0.148  -0.016  0.180
(-0.131)  (3.977)  (4.232)  (-0.174)  (2.044)
Wald  test of  joint  significance  (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Sargan test (p-value)  - - - 0.070  0.156
Test  for 1st-order  serial  correlation  (p-value)  - 0.033  0.000  0.000  0.000
Test  for 2nd-order  serial  correlation  (p-value)  - 0.340  0.357  0.248  0.174
Test for 3d-order  serial  correlation  (p-value)  - 0.189  0.610  0.149  0.260
Number  of observations  (Number  of  102  (102)  1836  (98)  1738  (98)  1640  (98)  1640  (98)
countries)
Notes: T-statistics  (in brackets)  computed  with  heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors.
a Expressed  in logs  (log  of [1  +x] for the real  interest  rate  and  the inflation  rate).
bMeasured  by  the first  difference  of the log.
c Both  the real  interest  rate  and  the inflation  rate are bounded  between  -50 percent  and  50 percent.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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